Abandoning Realization and the Transition Tax: Toward a Comprehensive Tax Base by Ordower, Henry
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 67 Number 5 Article 3 
12-1-2019 
Abandoning Realization and the Transition Tax: Toward a 
Comprehensive Tax Base 
Henry Ordower 
Saint Louis University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Taxation-Federal Commons, and the Tax Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Henry Ordower, Abandoning Realization and the Transition Tax: Toward a Comprehensive Tax Base, 67 
Buff. L. Rev. 1371 (2019). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol67/iss5/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at 
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
 
1371 
Buffalo Law Review 
VOLUME 67 DECEMBER 2019 NUMBER 5 
Abandoning Realization and the Transition 
Tax: Toward a Comprehensive Tax Base 
HENRY ORDOWER† 
INTRODUCTION 
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 20171 [hereinafter “TCJA”] 
was unusual in at least two respects. First, it was enacted 
with one major political party introducing and advancing the 
legislation without input from the other major party.2 
Second, several of its features overtly favor certain taxpayers 
over others.3 The TCJA also imposed a tax, the “transition 
tax,” on as much as thirty-one years of undistributed, 
accumulated corporate income.4 This article focuses on that 
transition tax by evaluating the function and 
constitutionality of the tax and considers whether the 
transition tax might serve as a model for addressing the 
 
†Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law, A.B. Washington 
University, M.A., J.D. The University of Chicago. 
 1. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2018). 
 2. Thomas Kaplan & Alan Rappeport, Republican Tax Bill Passes Senate in 
51-48 Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/19/us/ 
politics/tax-bill-vote-congress.html. 
 3. See, e.g., TCJA, § 11011(a), 131 Stat. at 2063 (2017) (amending Title 26 of 
the United States Code, adding I.R.C. § 199A (Supp. 2017) providing a twenty 
percent deduction of the income of certain individuals engaged in a trade or 
business other than as employees). 
 4. TCJA, § 14103(a), 131 Stat. at 2195 (2017) (amending I.R.C. § 965 to 
include the “transition tax,” replacing its existing but obsolete predecessor). 
1372 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  67 
broader problem of deferred income in the United States. The 
article recommends a broad-based, one-time marking to 
market of all property, inclusion of the net gain in the 
holders’ incomes at a significantly reduced rate of tax, 
followed by a transition to an accrual system of taxation 
under which growth in the value of taxpayers’ property is 
included in income annually. Such a scheme might permit 
taxpayers to pay the tax in installments over an extended 
period or, in some instances, defer payment of the tax until 
disposition of the property. Under such circumstances, 
deferral of the unpaid tax could incur an interest charge. 
Part I of the Article evaluates the transition tax in the 
context of offshore deferral of income in the U.S. worldwide 
taxation system. Part II describes the operation of the 
transition tax in its departure from tax precedent. Part III 
reviews the leading U.S. Supreme Court decision of Eisner v. 
Macomber,5 with facts closely resembling the transition tax 
facts, and the increasing number of departures from the 
realization/income requirement which have become part of 
the tax law. Part IV examines the controlled foreign 
corporation [hereinafter “CFC”] rules through which the 
transition tax operates to ascertain if those rules provide 
independent support for departure from the realization 
principle. Part V considers first the abandonment of 
realization and the current taxation of appreciation and 
depreciation in the value of property against the backdrop of 
a Haig-Simons comprehensive income tax definition of 
income6 and then the relationship between the capital gain 
 
 5. 252 U.S. 189 (1920). 
 6. The classic Haig–Simons definition of income is “the algebraic sum of (1) 
the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the 
value of the store of property rights between the beginning and end of the period 
in question.” HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF 
INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 50 (1938). 
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tax preference7 and the realization principle.8 Part VI 
concludes by proposing adaptation of the transition tax 
single incident of taxation as a model for the design of a 
broad-based transition tax that would lay the foundation for 
accretion taxation of gain and loss from property consistent 
with comprehensive tax bases following the Haig-Simons 
income model. 
I. THE TRANSITION TAX 
The transition tax9 requires the one-time inclusion of 
“deferred foreign income”10 in the income of United States 
shareholders11 of CFCs12 and other “specified foreign 
corporations.”13 The concepts of “deferred income” and 
“deferral” with respect to foreign source income refer to the 
income from the conduct of a corporate trade or business 
outside the U.S. through one or more non-U.S. subsidiary 
corporations. Since the U.S. taxes U.S. citizens, residents 
and domestic corporations on their income from all sources 
 
 7. Net capital gain is taxed at a rate lower than ordinary income, making 
long-term capital gain favored gain. I.R.C. § 1(h) (2012). See also I.R.C. § 1222(11) 
(Supp. 2017) (defining net capital gain as the excess of net long-term capital gain 
over net short-term capital loss). 
 8. See Walter J. Blum, A Handy Summary of the Capital Gains Arguments, 
35 TAXES 247, 249 (1957) (see discussion infra Part V). 
 9. I.R.C. § 965. 
 10. Id. 
 11. The definition of United States shareholder [hereinafter “U.S. 
shareholder”] is a shareholder of a controlled foreign corporation (see infra note 
12), who owns ten percent or more of the voting interests and value of said 
corporation. I.R.C. § 951(b) (Supp. 2017). 
 12. The definition of controlled foreign corporation is a corporation having 
U.S. shareholders who own more than fifty percent of the voting rights or value 
of the corporation’s shares. I.R.C. § 957(a) (Supp. 2017). 
 13. Specified foreign corporations are foreign corporations having a U.S. 
shareholder that is a domestic corporation, even if the foreign corporations are 
not CFCs. I.R.C. § 965(e)(1)(B). For a discussion of the new international tax 
provisions and elimination of deferral through foreign corporations that is a 
function of the realization requirement, see Daniel N. Shaviro, The New Non-
Territorial U.S. International Tax System, 160 TAX NOTES 57 (2018). 
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worldwide,14 the foreign source income of a domestic 
corporation is subject to current U.S. taxation. With limited 
exceptions,15 the foreign source income of a foreign 
corporation,16 whether or not owned by U.S. persons, is not 
subject to the U.S. income tax.17 Use of the term “deferral” 
contemplates that the U.S. parent corporation could have 
conducted the corporate trade or business outside the U.S. 
and earned the foreign income itself, but chose not to do so 
and remains the ultimate, indirect owner of the income 
through its share ownership in the foreign corporation.18 In 
 
 14. I.R.C. § 61 (Supp. 2017) (defining gross income as “all income from 
whatever source derived”). In addition, Part III of subchapter B of the I.R.C. 
expressly excludes certain items from gross income. See the participation 
exemption found in I.R.C. § 245A (Supp. 2017) (excluding dividends by means of 
a dividends received deduction out of the foreign source income of foreign 
corporations from the income of their domestic corporate owners owning ten 
percent or more of the foreign corporation). See also CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON, 
ROBERT J. PERONI, AND RICHARD CRAWFORD PUGH, TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
TRANSACTIONS: MATERIALS, TEXT AND PROBLEMS 169 (1997). 
 15. Foreign source income of a foreign corporation that is effectively 
connected with the conduct of a U.S. trade or business is taxable in the U.S. under 
the worldwide taxation principle as the U.S. trade or business is taxable on its 
worldwide income. I.R.C. § 882(a) (Supp. 2017). Subpart F income, as defined in 
I.R.C. § 952 (Supp. 2017), is includable in the gross income of the U.S. 
shareholders of a CFC on a limited pass-through basis under I.R.C. § 951. See 
discussion infra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 16. Certain U.S. source income of a foreign corporation is taxable through a 
withholding tax in the U.S. under I.R.C. § 881 (2012), and both U.S. source and 
foreign source income that is effectively connected with the conduct of a U.S. 
trade or business is taxable. I.R.C. § 882(a) (referring to effectively connected 
income). 
 17. Shaviro, supra note 13, at 70 (discussing the history of deferral). 
Similarly, U.S. parent corporations are not taxable on the income of their U.S. 
subsidiaries because they are separate taxable entities. The parent and its 
subsidiaries may combine their incomes by consenting to file a consolidated 
income tax return. I.R.C. § 1501 (2012). 
 18. Some seek to give the use of the term “deferred” in the statute greater 
definitional significance by distinguishing deferred from excluded income. Hank 
Adler & Lacy Williams, The Worst Statutory Precedent in Over 100 Years, 160 
TAX NOTES 1415–17 (2018). This article views use of deferred and deferral as 
simply the adoption by Congress of the term customarily used for offshore 
corporate profits. 
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the case of working control of the subsidiary,19 the control 
would enable the U.S. corporation to cause the foreign 
corporation to distribute the foreign source income earned by 
the foreign corporation to the domestic corporation and 
possibly other shareholders. In the case of other specified 
foreign corporations,20 which are not CFCs and over which 
U.S. shareholders do not have working control, the power to 
cause the foreign corporation to distribute the income may 
be absent, leaving the shareholder with transition tax 
liability and no source of funds with which to pay the tax. 
Unless a corporation and its shareholders make certain 
elections,21 corporate income is taxable only to the corporate 
entity, and not to its shareholders, until the corporation 
distributes the income to its shareholders. Distributions 
need not be actual distributions directly to the shareholders 
but may be constructive as well. Constructive distributions 
constitute dividends and include payments to third parties 
that benefit a shareholder, payments to persons related to a 
shareholder,22 and payments to shareholders 
mischaracterized as payments for services because they 
exceed reasonable amounts of compensation.23 The excess 
compensation amount is reclassified as a non-deductible 
dividend rather than tax deductible compensation.24 
 
 19. Here the term “control” is used to refer to the voting power to direct 
distribution from the corporation as opposed to the tax definition of control under 
the CFC or other corporate tax rules. 
 20. Shaviro, supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 21. See I.R.C. § 1362 (Supp. 2017) (permitting election to be an S corporation 
with corporate income taxable to the corporation’s shareholders); I.R.C. § 1501 
(permitting consolidated returns with consent of all affiliated corporations in 
group). 
 22. Arnes v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 522, 530 (1994) (concluding that 
redemption of shares from divorced spouse is a constructive dividend to husband 
who continued to own the corporation). 
 23. I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (Supp. 2017) (allowing a deduction for compensation 
only to the extent the compensation is reasonable). 
 24. See generally INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, REASONABLE COMPENSATION 
JOB AID FOR IRS VALUATION PROFESSIONALS (2014) https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
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Shareholders of regulated investment companies may 
consent to reinvest their dividends without receiving the 
dividends in cash with the constructive distributions that are 
reinvested being classified as ordinary income and long term 
capital gain on a limited pass-through method under which 
the corporation is itself not taxable on the income.25 
Similarly, shareholders of passive foreign investment 
companies [hereinafter “PFIC”] may make qualified electing 
fund elections and include their shares of a foreign 
corporation’s income and long-term capital gain annually.26 
The PFIC itself is taxable in the U.S. on its U.S. source 
income, if any, and may be taxable in other jurisdictions on 
its income earned there. Only in the case of U.S. 
shareholders of CFCs are shareholders of a corporation 
taxable on some corporate income in the absence of a 
distribution or an election to become taxable without a 
distribution.27 
Historically, the foreign source income, other than its 
subpart F income,28 of a foreign subsidiary became subject to 
U.S. tax only when it was “repatriated.” Repatriation refers 
to the distribution by the foreign corporation of all or part of 
its accumulated income to its U.S. owners as a dividend, 
possibly when those U.S. owners vote their shares to require 
the distribution. The term applied to such distributions, 




 25. I.R.C. § 852 (Supp. 2017). 
 26. I.R.C. § 1293 (Supp. 2017). 
 27. See I.R.C. § 551 (2000), repealed by American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, 
Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 413, 118 Stat. 1418, 1506 (imputing dividends from foreign 
personal holding companies and taxing them currently to their owners in the 
U.S.). Repeal served a tax simplification purpose to eliminate overlapping anti-
deferral regimes. H.R. Rep. No. 108-548(I), at 127. See also Henry Ordower, The 
Expatriation Tax, Deferrals, Mark to Market, The Macomber Conundrum and 
Doubtful Constitutionality, 15 Pitt. Tax Rev. 1, 18 (2017) (arguing that the foreign 
personal holding company inclusion probably was unconstitutional). 
 28. I.R.C. § 952 (Supp. 2017) (defining subpart F income). See generally 
discussion of subpart F and CFC infra text accompanying note 127. 
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income as belonging to the U.S. parent corporation owner 
even if earned and held by the foreign corporation. 
II. OPERATION OF THE TRANSITION TAX 
The transition tax29 departs from the longstanding tax 
principle that corporate income is taxable to the 
corporation’s shareholders only when distributed to them. 
Previously, Congress encouraged repatriation of 
accumulated foreign income by temporarily reducing the rate 
of tax for repatriations with an 85 percent dividends received 
deduction for certain cash distributions from CFCs to their 
corporate U.S. shareholders.30 Formerly, Internal Revenue 
Code Section 965 required an actual distribution, without 
which the U.S. shareholders would have had no inclusion in 
income. Now, Section 965 requires neither actual nor 
constructive distribution31 from the foreign corporation, as it 
includes the foreign corporation’s accumulated foreign 
source earnings and profits32 in the foreign corporation’s 
subpart F income for the corporation’s taxable year 
beginning in 2017.33 The subpart F income in turn is 
includable pro rata in its U.S. shareholders’ incomes under 
 
 29. I.R.C. § 965 (Supp. 2017). 
 30. I.R.C. § 965 (2004). The 2004 statute was effective for only a single tax 
year under the I.R.C. § 965(f) election. 
 31. Both actual and constructive distributions are includable under I.R.C. 
§ 301 to the extent of the distributing corporation’s current and accumulated 
earnings and profits. There is a constructive distribution when the recipient could 
have taken an actual distribution but elected not to do so. Constructive 
distributions are common in mutual funds when account holders check the box 
for an election to reinvest dividends. 
 32. I.R.C. § 965 uses the term “post-1986 deferred foreign income” rather than 
accumulated earnings and profits in order to exclude amounts that would not 
have generated taxable dividends if distributed by foreign corporation to its U.S. 
shareholders because the amounts either already were taxed under the CFC 
rules to the US shareholders and or were taxed in the U.S. as income effectively 
connected with the conduct of a U.S. trade or business. 
 33. I.R.C. § 965(a) (explaining that if the foreign corporation has more than 
one year beginning in 2017, the applicable year is the last of those years). 
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the CFC rules.34 In addition, the inclusion under the 
transition tax also applies to U.S. shareholders of foreign 
corporations that are not CFCs if they have at least one 
corporate U.S. shareholder.35 
The portion of the subpart F income includable under the 
transition tax is accompanied by a deduction that has the 
effect of reducing the rate of the transition tax to fifteen-and-
a-half percent of the foreign corporations’ assets, consisting 
of cash and cash equivalent positions, and eight percent on 
the remaining amount included under the transition tax.36 
The higher rate of tax on cash equivalents than on operating 
assets reflects the view that deferral and holding of 
investment assets is an unnecessary accumulation of the 
deferred income, while operating assets represent a 
historically justified investment. In the case of a corporate 
U.S. shareholder in the foreign corporation, the deduction 
amount does not qualify for the indirect foreign tax credit37 
or the deduction for the taxes paid outside the U.S.,38 while 
the net amount of the inclusion does qualify for the indirect 
foreign tax credit or deduction.39 
By taxing some or all of the foreign corporation’s pre-
2018 accumulated foreign source earnings and profits in 
2017,40 the transition tax41 facilitates the shift to a 
 
 34. I.R.C. § 951(a) (Supp. 2017). 
 35. I.R.C. § 965(e)(1)(B) (other foreign corporations with a corporate U.S. 
shareholder). The deferred foreign earnings attributable to U.S. owners who are 
not U.S. shareholders, supra note 11, remain “deferred” and would be taxed to 
their U.S. owners when distributed. 
 36. I.R.C. § 965(c) (an incomplete participation exemption). 
 37. I.R.C. § 902, repealed by TCJA, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017). 
 38. I.R.C. § 164(a)(3) (Supp. 2017) (forbidding deduction for foreign taxes if 
the taxpayer claims a foreign tax credit under I.R.C. § 275(a)(4)). 
 39. I.R.C. § 965(g) (denial of foreign tax credit). 
 40. But see I.R.C. § 965(h) (permitting the taxpayer to elect to pay the 
transition tax in installments over eight years without interest). 
 41. I.R.C. § 965. 
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participation exemption system42 for distributions from 
certain foreign corporations to their domestic corporate U.S. 
shareholders. The participation exemption43 introduces 
limited territoriality into the U.S. federal income tax system 
by eliminating the U.S. tax on dividends from foreign source 
earnings of a foreign corporation (other than a PFIC)44 to a 
domestic corporation that is a U.S. shareholder of the foreign 
corporation. Elimination of U.S. income tax results from a 
100 percent deduction for dividends received out of the 
foreign source income of the foreign corporation.45 Except to 
the extent of the amount included under the transition tax, 
no similar prospective deduction is available to non-
corporate U.S. shareholders of a CFC, even if they were 
subject to the transition tax.46 Insofar as post-2017 
distributions of foreign source earnings from the foreign 
corporation to its corporate U.S. shareholders will not 
become subject to income tax in the U.S.,47 the immediate 
inclusion of the accumulated foreign source earnings and 
profits in the foreign corporation’s subpart F income in 2017 
under the transition tax48 limits the amount of foreign 
earnings accumulated before 2018 that will never be taxed 
in the U.S. because of the participation exemption. The 
transition tax clears away the backlog of potential tax to 
make room for a new participation exemption system. 
 
 42. I.R.C. § 245A(a) (Supp. 2017) (dividend received deduction for CFC 
distributions). 
 43. I.R.C. § 245A. 
 44. I.R.C. § 1297 (Supp. 2017). 
 45. I.R.C. § 245A(a). 
 46. I.R.C. § 959(a) (Supp. 2017) (exclusion of previously taxed earnings and 
profits). Note, however that amounts distributed to non-corporate U.S. 
shareholders out of pre-2018 accumulated, foreign source earnings and profits of 
the foreign corporation in excess of the amount included to the shareholder under 
the transition tax would seem to remain taxable as dividends. 
 47. I.R.C. § 245A. 
 48. I.R.C. § 965 (Supp. 2017). 
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The participation exemption49 for distributions from 
foreign corporations removes the U.S. tax barrier to ongoing 
repatriation of income earned through foreign subsidiaries 
and simplifies U.S. international taxation by eliminating the 
indirect foreign tax credit.50 As it facilitates the change to the 
participation exemption, however, the transition tax 
requires the immediate inclusion of the accumulated foreign 
source earnings and profits of those foreign subsidiaries, 
without accompanying distributions,51 in the foreign 
corporation’s subpart F income and hence in the incomes of 
its U.S. shareholders.52 That inclusion is contrary to judicial 
precedent and may be constitutionally infirm.53 
A strong constitutional challenge to the transition tax, 
however, is unlikely to follow.54 Like an earlier incursion on 
the realization requirement in annually marking to market 
certain commodities positions,55 the transition tax also offers 
a significantly reduced rate of tax56 and interest free 
 
 49. I.R.C. § 245A. 
 50. I.R.C. § 902 (2004) repealed by TCJA, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 
(2018). 
 51. I.R.C. § 965. 
 52. See supra text accompanying note 29. 
 53. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 219 (1920) (holding a stock dividend 
not to be income under the 16th Amendment). See also Adler & Willis, supra note 
18; Mark E. Berg & Fred Feingold, The Deemed Repatriation Tax—A Bridge Too 
Far?, 158 TAX NOTES 1345, 1345 (2018) (arguing the tax is a direct tax in violation 
of the apportionment clause because it taxes property and not income). 
 54. But cf. Berg & Feingold, supra note 53, at 1350 (identifying taxpayers who 
would have an interest in challenging the application of the statute). See also 
Moore v. United States, No. 2:19-CV-01539 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 9, 2019) (Westlaw) 
(challenging the statute on constitutional grounds). 
 55. I.R.C. § 1256 (2012) (codifying mark to market inclusion in income of 
appreciation and depreciation of commodities positions). See also Henry Ordower, 
Revisiting Realization: Accretion Taxation, the Constitution, Macomber, and 
Mark to Market, 13 VA. TAX REV. 1, 96 (1993) (arguing that market participants 
benefit from the exception to the realization requirement because of the 60/40 
split of gain into long term and short term without regard to actual holding 
period). 
 56. I.R.C. § 965(c); supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
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installment reporting57 of the taxable amount to U.S. 
shareholders who must include the subpart F income created 
by the transition tax. The simultaneous or subsequent actual 
repatriation by a distribution from the foreign corporation is 
free from further U.S. income taxation even if it precedes the 
inclusion in income deferred through installment 
reporting.58 Certainly, many U.S. shareholders would have 
participated voluntarily and happily in a no-strings-attached 
tax reduction for repatriations,59 and will seize the 
opportunity to repatriate the earnings of their foreign 
subsidiaries at a reduced tax rate.60 
III. MACOMBER AND REALIZATION 
The Sixteenth Amendment permits federal taxation of 
incomes without apportionment among the states.61 Neither 
the constitutional amendment nor any taxing statute defines 
income and the amendment is silent concerning realization 
 
 57. I.R.C. § 965(h)(1) (U.S. shareholders generally); § 965(i)(4) (S corporation 
shareholders); supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 58. I.R.C. § 959(a) (Supp. 2017) (exclusion of distributions from income if out 
of earnings and profits of a foreign corporation previously included under I.R.C. 
§ 951(a)). 
 59. See discussion of the temporary dividends received deduction for 
repatriations supra text accompanying note 30. The 2004 tax holiday required 
the investment of repatriated funds in the U.S. but the discussion of a further tax 
holiday for repatriation continued actively in years preceding the TCJA. See, e.g., 
Chye-Ching Huang, Three Types of “Repatriation Tax” on Overseas Profits: 
Understanding the Differences, CTR. FOR BUDGET AND POL’Y PROCS. (Oct. 7, 2016), 
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/4-10-15tax.pdf (outlining 
differences in types of tax holidays). 
 60. Indications are that the transition tax and its accompanying opportunity 
to repatriate triggers stock buybacks rather than increased U.S. investment. 
Matt Egan, Tax cut triggers $437 billion explosion of stock buybacks, CNN MONEY 
(July 10, 2018), https://money.cnn.com/2018/07/10/investing/stock-buybacks-
record-tax-cuts/index.html; Alix Langone, Here’s How America’s Biggest 
Companies Are Spending Their Trump Tax Cuts (It’s Not on New Jobs), MONEY 
(May 17, 2018) http://time.com/money/5267940/companies-spending-trump-tax-
cuts-stock-buybacks/. 
 61. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
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as a requirement for inclusion of income.62 While the early 
tax acts do not define income or realization, the years of 
intervening practice and judicial decisions have shed much 
light on the concepts of “income” and “amount realized” 
under the amendment, but not for the concept of 
realization.63 That same statute determines the amount of 
gain or loss from the sale or other disposition of property 
relative to the amount realized.64 
Under the governing statute, a taxpayer realizes gain or 
loss when the taxpayer sells or otherwise disposes of 
property, changing the taxpayer’s relationship to the 
property.65 A taxpayer who receives consideration from the 
sale or other disposition of property realizes gain equal to the 
excess of the amount of consideration received66 over the 
taxpayer’s adjusted basis67 in the property, or realizes a loss 
if the taxpayer’s adjusted basis exceeds the amount of 
consideration received.68 The statute measures the amount 
realized as the sum of the money plus the fair market value 
of property other than money the taxpayer receives.69 When 
there is uncertainty about the value of the taxpayer’s 
property but not the value of the consideration received, or 
vice versa, the properties or properties plus money paid are 
assumed to be equal in value under a doctrine of exchange 
equivalency,70 so long as the parties are dealing at arm’s 
 
 62. Id. The amendment reads: “The Congress shall have power to lay and 
collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment 
among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.” 
 63. I.R.C. § 1001(b) (2012) defines “[t]he amount realized from the sale or 
other disposition of property shall be the sum of any money received plus the fair 
market value of the property (other than money) received.” 
 64. I.R.C. § 1001(a). 
 65. Id. 
 66. The “amount realized.” I.R.C. § 1001(b). 
 67. I.R.C. § 1011(a) (2012). 
 68. I.R.C. § 1001(a). 
 69. I.R.C. § 1001(b). 
 70. Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184, 
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length. If all or part of the consideration is services rendered 
to or for the benefit of the seller, the amount realized includes 
the value of those services.71 
The concept of sale is reasonably straightforward but the 
disposition to which the statute refers is less so. In the case 
of a sale, the person who relinquishes the property receives 
money, other property, services or a combination of types of 
consideration. The concept of “other disposition” is vague.72 
Abandonment of property is a disposition for zero 
consideration and not a sale or exchange unless the property 
is encumbered by debt, which the abandoning taxpayer will 
not have to repay. Absent a sale, the taxpayer should be able 
to deduct the amount of the taxpayer’s adjusted basis in the 
property if the taxpayer holds the property for investment or 
use in the taxpayer’s trade or business.73 If the property is 
encumbered, however, the taxpayer is deemed to have sold 
the property for the amount of the liability encumbering it 
plus any additional consideration and has not abandoned 
it.74 
Similarly, a gift might seem to be an “other disposition” 
with the amount realized being zero but resulting in no 
 
188–89 (Ct. Cl. 1954). 
 71. Neither the realization statute nor the regulations under the statute 
express this concept. However, I.R.C. § 83 requires a service provider to include 
in income the fair market value of property he or she receives for services in 
income—subject to possible deferral of the inclusion until the property becomes 
transferable or ceases to be subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. I.R.C. 
§ 83(a)(1) (2012). See also 26 C.F.R. § 1.83-6(b) (2017) (interpreting the interplay 
between I.R.C. § 83 and I.R.C. § 1001 to treat the service providers’ inclusion in 
income as an amount realized for the property).  
 72. On other dispositions, see Jeffrey L. Kwall, When Should Asset 
Appreciation Be Taxed?: The Case for a Disposition Standard of Realization, 86 
IND. L.J. 77, 78 (2011) (arguing for giving effect to the “other disposition” 
language). 
 73. I.R.C. § 165 (2012). 
 74. Comm’r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 307 (1983) (property encumbered with debt 
exceeding the fair market value of the property is a sale for the amount of the 
debt). See also the statutory codification of the Tufts rule found in I.R.C. § 7701(g) 
(2012) (fair market value of property encumbered by non-recourse debt not less 
than the amount of the debt). 
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taxable loss because the gift is a personal transaction and 
neither a trade or business transaction nor a transaction 
engaged in for profit and it is not a casualty loss.75 In 
addition, gifts burden or benefit the gift recipient with the 
donor’s historical adjusted basis76 and preserve pre-gift 
appreciation for future inclusion by the donee.77 Charitable 
gifts, on the other hand, do generate a deduction for the 
donor but not a loss from an “other disposition” for zero 
consideration.78 The donor realizes no gain or loss on the 
charitable disposition but may be denied a deduction if the 
donor received the property in a transaction in which the 
donor had no income from the receipt and did not pay for the 
donated property.79 Preservation of basis in the hands of the 
charitable donee is usually of little or no significance as the 
pre-gift appreciation will not produce realized and taxable 
gain in the future because the charitable owner of the 
property is exempt from taxation.80 
“Other disposition” also might refer to encumbrance of 
property in exchange for a loan in which the taxpayer 
receives consideration and relinquishes a non-possessory 
 
 75. I.R.C. § 165(c)(3). 
 76. I.R.C. § 1015(a) (2012). If the fair market value of the property is less than 
the donor’s adjusted basis at the time of the gift, for purposes of determining loss, 
the donee’s basis is that fair market value, yet the donor does not realize a loss 
at the time of the gift disposition. 
 77. Gifts from decedents differ from gifts from living donors. Decedents’ 
donees take a new fair market value basis in the property thereby eliminating 
historical appreciation as a source of gain without an inclusion in income. I.R.C. 
§ 1014(a)(1) (2012). 
 78. I.R.C. § 170 (2012). 
 79. Haverly v. United States, 513 F.2d 224, 226–27 (7th Cir. 1975) (denial of 
deduction for complimentary text books donated to charity). 
 80. I.R.C. § 501(a) (2012). If a charitable donee ceases to remain exempt from 
taxation or later uses the property in an unrelated trade or business and then 
sells the property, the sale would be taxable insofar as the sale price exceeds the 
donor’s adjusted basis (although the necessary records of basis may be 
unavailable). And the charity would adjust the basis, if the property otherwise 
were depreciable, on a straight line schedule during the charitable use period. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.1016-4(b) (as amended in 1963). 
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interest in the property as security,81 but does not realize 
gain because the taxpayer has an obligation to repay the 
loan.82 There are transactions in which the taxpayer does not 
relinquish the property, but receives consideration for it and 
may realize gain.83 For example, a payment of damages is 
applied against the owner’s adjusted basis and the amount 
in excess of basis is gain realized.84 
Realization is usually a precursor to inclusion in income. 
Without realization of gain, there is no taxable event and 
traditionally nothing to tax. Only if the taxpayer realizes 
gain and there is no exception deferring inclusion in 
income,85 and there are many exceptions,86 is gain realized 
from the sale or exchange87 of property includable in the 
income of the owner of the property.88 Conversely, absent a 
sale or other disposition, appreciation in the value of 
property is not includable in income. Statutory exceptions to 
the realization requirement for gain on the appreciation of 
property exist and are growing slowly in number. The 
exceptions include the periodic inclusion of original issue 
discount on debt instruments;89 annual marking to market 
 
 81. E.g. a mortgage or Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 security interest. 
 82. But the owner is deemed to have sold the property for the outstanding 
balance of loan, plus any additional consideration if a buyer assumes or takes 
subject to the debt, or the owner fails to repay the debt and yields the property to 
the lender in lieu of foreclosure. 
 83. Taxpayers may elect to defer, recognizing the gain with an election. I.R.C. 
§ 1033 (2012). 
 84. Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(c) (2017). 
 85. I.R.C. § 1001(c) (2012). 
 86. Exceptions include, for example, exchange of property for entity interests 
under I.R.C. §§ 351, 721 (2012) and like kind exchanges under I.R.C. § 1031 
(2012). 
 87. I.R.C. § 1001(c). The recognition and inclusion provision in I.R.C. § 1001 
introduces the terms “exchange” and “recognize,” but excludes any reference to 
“other disposition.” 
 88. Id. 
 89. I.R.C. § 1272 (2012) (an embedded contractual increase in value 
substituting for current payment of interest on the debt). Original issue discount 
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and inclusion in income of unrealized appreciation, or 
deduction of unrealized depreciation, of certain commodities, 
financial instruments90 and dealer held securities,91 
similarly marking to market of the property of individuals 
who expatriate at the time of expatriation;92 and most 
recently, the transition tax.93 
While the realization concept has been critical to 
determining the income taxable under the Sixteenth 
Amendment,94 realization is not a function of the 
amendment. The amendment permitted the taxation of 
income without apportionment among the states.95 Neither 
the amendment96 nor the taxing statute97 defined income. 
The amendment permitted the taxation of income without 
apportionment and the statute exercised Congress’s power to 
tax income including wages, dividends, and gains derived 
from property. Before adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment, 
 
accrual is, arguably, not a realization, but an accounting matter forcing cash 
basis taxpayers onto accrual accounting for original issue discount. I.R.C. 
§ 267(a)(2) (Supp. 2017) places accrual basis tax transparent entities onto the 
cash basis method of their owners who receive otherwise deductible payments 
from the entity. 
 90. I.R.C. § 1256 (2012) (annual marking of regulated futures contracts, 
foreign currency contracts, nonequity options, dealer equity options, and dealers 
securities futures contracts but gain or loss sixty percent long term capital and 
forty percent short term capital regardless of actual holding period). 
 91. I.R.C. § 475 (2012) (security dealers’ inventory marked to market). 
 92. I.R.C. § 877A (2012) (expatriation tax imposed which also terminates 
other deferrals of income and gain). 
 93. I.R.C. § 965 (Supp. 2017). 
 94. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
 95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. Congress had the power to tax income before 
the Sixteenth Amendment, but could do so only if the income tax was apportioned 
among the states. Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1916) (holding 
the Revenue Act of 1913, imposing the income tax after the adoption of the 
Sixteenth Amendment to be constitutional without apportionment). 
 96. “The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from 
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several states . . . .” 
U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
 97. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § 2(A), 38 Stat 114, 166 (exercising Congress’s 
new power to tax income without apportionment). 
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the taxation of income, including gain from the sale or other 
disposition of property, was permissible but impractical 
because it could not be apportioned among the states in any 
reasonable manner. Thus, direct taxation of income was 
impermissible because it was not apportioned and not 
because it was unrealized.98 
Under various definitions, including the classic Haig-
Simons definition,99 appreciation in the value of property is 
income. Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court definitively 
rejected that formulation of income in Macomber100 and has 
neither reversed nor modified its position on income since 
that decision. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.101 is not 
to the contrary. Citing Macomber with approval,102 
Glenshaw Glass clarifies that income is not only the produce 
of labor or capital or both, but may result from other forms 
of enrichment, although not from the growth in value of 
capital without realization.103 
Macomber dealt with the taxability of stock dividends 
that the governing statute104 expressly included in gross 
income to the extent of their cash value. The Supreme Court 
stated that it intended to address the constitutional issue 
regarding the stock dividend105 and emphasized that the 
taxation of anything other than income remains subject to 
the apportionment requirements of the Constitution.106 The 
Court held that income includes gain derived and separated 
 
 98. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 607–08, aff’d on reh’g, 
158 U.S. 601 (1895), (holding unapportioned taxes under the Income Tax Act of 
1894 unconstitutional because they were not apportioned). 
 99. SIMONS, supra note 6, at 41. 
 100. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 218-19 (1920). 
 101. 348 U.S. 426 (1955). 
 102. Id. at 430–31. 
 103. Id. at 431. 
 104. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 2(a), 39 Stat. 756, 757. 
 105. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 205. 
 106. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. 
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from capital but not the simple increase in the value of the 
capital or gain accruing to the capital.107 Further the Court 
observed that the earnings of a corporation are not the 
property of the shareholder. The corporation may distribute 
its earnings among the shareholders as cash dividends or 
liquidating distributions but until distributed the earnings 
remain corporate property and not shareholder property. 
Stock dividends do not separate property from the 
corporation and place it in the hands of the shareholders,108 
since the shareholder owns only the same interest in the 
corporation as before the dividend and no greater interest in 
the corporation’s underlying assets. The separateness of the 
corporation from its shareholders is fundamental.109 The 
Court stated: 
We are clear that not only does a stock dividend really take nothing 
from the property of the corporation and add nothing to that of the 
shareholder, but that the antecedent accumulation of profits 
evidenced thereby, while indicating that the shareholder is the 
richer because of an increase of his capital, at the same time shows 
he has not realized or received any income in the transaction.110 
Further: “enrichment through increase in value of 
capital investment is not income in any proper meaning of 
the term.”111 And “what is called the stockholder’s share in 
the accumulated profits of the company is capital, not 
income.”112 
The transition tax includes in U.S. shareholders’ 
incomes the shareholders’ proportional share of a foreign 
corporation’s retained profits without any distribution or 
 
 107. Macomber, 252 U.S. at 207. 
 108. Id. at 211. 
 109. Id. at 214. That separation breaks down to some degree in the CFC rules, 
infra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 110. Id. at 212. The Court also points out that the shareholder lacks liquidity 
to pay the tax following a stock dividend without selling shares and diminishing 
her proportional interest in the company. Id. at 213. 
 111. Id. at 214–15. 
 112. Id. at 219. 
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separation from the corporation’s assets. It is difficult to 
imagine facts more closely resembling the issues addressed 
and resolved in Macomber. In defining accumulated foreign 
earnings as subpart F income, the transition tax includes the 
accumulation as income to the corporation’s shareholders 
even though, under Macomber, it clearly is not. 
IV. CFC AND THE TRANSITION TAX 
While there can be little doubt that the transition tax 
respects neither the realization nor the income requirement 
of Macomber, or Glenshaw Glass for that matter, perhaps the 
threshold of realization was crossed long ago with the 
enactment of the CFC provisions of the Internal Revenue 
Code and later diminished further as a barrier to inclusion 
in income by the mark to market rules and the expatriation 
tax. Recent scholarship argues that the transition tax is 
unconstitutional as a direct tax that must be apportioned. 
One argument is that the transition tax simply is not a tax 
on income but a tax on property because it reaches events not 
in the current tax year.113 Another argument for an 
unconstitutional direct tax identifies the income taxed as 
excluded rather than deferred income so that retroactive 
inclusion of the income becomes a direct tax.114 A third 
related argument characterizes the tax as a direct tax on 
wealth also subject to apportionment.115 
The transition tax enters gross income through the 
subpart F door. The longstanding CFC rules116 include 
 
 113. Berg & Feingold, supra note 53, at 1358-59 (the authors offer some specific 
computations on the effect of the tax and suggest the characteristics of taxpayers 
who might challenge the tax and limitations on how they could do so in light of 
statute of limitations concerns). 
 114. Adler & Willis, supra note 18, at 1415. 
 115. Sean P. McElroy, The Mandatory Repatriation Tax is Unconstitutional, 
36 YALE J. REG. BULL. 69, 81 (2018). 
 116. Subpart F was added to the Code by the Revenue Act of 1962. See 
generally Melissa Redmiles & Jason Wenrich, A History of Controlled Foreign 
Corporations and the Foreign Tax Credit, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (Sept. 13, 
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portions of the income of CFCs in the incomes of U.S. 
shareholders despite the income being earned, but not 
distributed, by the CFC. While the inclusion to the U.S. 
shareholders of subpart F income seems a violation of the 
Macomber holding, the inclusion does not impute a taxable 
dividend, as the possibly unconstitutional foreign personal 
holding company provisions did before their repeal,117 nor 
would it force a realization of gain as the mark to market 
rules do.118 Instead, the CFC inclusion relies more closely on 
the assignment of income doctrine for support.119 Certain 
types of CFC income have either i) a minimal or no 
connection with the CFC’s jurisdiction and a closer 
connection with another jurisdiction;120 or ii) no non-tax, 
business reason for placement in the CFC rather than in the 
hands of the CFC’s U.S. shareholders.121 Accordingly, from a 
business perspective, the link between the subpart F income 
and the CFC is tenuous. Since assignment of the income to 
the CFC is arbitrary, the CFC provisions simply assign the 
income to the taxpayers who control the decision on 
placement of the income.122 Were there no CFC provisions, 
 
2013), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/historycfcftc.pdf (history of the CFC 
provisions). 
 117. I.R.C. § 551 (2000), repealed by American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. 
L. No. 108-357, § 413(a)(i), 118 Stat. 1418, 1506. See also Ordower, supra note 27, 
at 18 (arguing that the foreign personal holding company inclusion probably was 
unconstitutional). 
 118. E.g., I.R.C. § 1256 (2012) (commodities futures); I.R.C. § 475 (2012) 
(dealer securities), I.R.C. § 877A (2012) (expatriation tax). 
 119. The principle barring assignment of income in some circumstances 
emerges from Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114 (1930) (taxing husband on the 
share of his income from his personal services that he anticipatorily assigned to 
his wife under a binding contract because he, and not his wife, was the one who 
produced the income). 
 120. E.g., I.R.C. § 954(a)(2)-(3) (Supp. 2017) (foreign base company sales and 
services income). 
 121. E.g., I.R.C. § 954 (a)(1) (foreign personal holding company income). 
 122. I.R.C. § 951(b) (Supp. 2017) (defining U.S. shareholders of a CFC). CFCs 
are only those foreign corporations in which U.S. shareholders own more than 50 
percent voting control and value but the CFC inclusion rules occasionally may 
include some U.S. shareholders who have no control, even as part of a control 
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the IRS might use the more general income allocation rule to 
achieve the same end for the subpart F income.123 
This assignment of income analysis of the CFC rules is 
imperfect. Under the CFC regime, it is possible that the 
CFC’s subpart F income will be subject to the income tax in 
another taxing jurisdiction such as the CFC’s country of 
residence, while under general assignment of income 
principles, the income would be attributed to the correct 
taxpayer and away from the taxpayer to which it in fact was 
assigned.124 That limitation on the analysis seems less 
problematic when compared with the transfer pricing 
instances in which income is properly attributed to a 
taxpayer different from the taxpayer reporting the income, 
but the jurisdiction in which the taxpayer reported the 
income does not relinquish its claim to tax the income so that 
more than one taxing jurisdiction taxes the income.125 
A second limitation on the analysis is the character of 
the income. Unlike expressly tax transparent entities,126 the 
CFC provisions do not preserve character. Instead, the CFC 
inclusion transforms all subpart F income into ordinary 
income of an unspecified character.127 For purposes of the 
foreign tax credit however, a “look-thru (sic)” rule applies128 
 
group, over the activities of the CFC. 
 123. I.R.C. § 482 (Supp. 2017). 
 124. Id. (as applied to the statute’s primary use, transfer pricing). See also 
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-1–9 (2017). 
 125. For example, absent an advance pricing agreement or the concurrence of 
the competent authorities from both or multiple jurisdictions, a U.S. taxpayer 
may be allocated income from a transaction that another country also taxes. 
 126. E.g., I.R.C. § 702(b) (Supp. 2017) (partnerships); I.R.C. § 1366(b) (Supp. 
2017) (S corporations); I.R.C. § 852 (Supp. 2017) (regulated investment 
companies distributing their income and separating and preserving the character 
of ordinary income, long term capital gain and exempt interest as the income 
passes through to shareholders as dividends); I.R.C. § 1293 (Supp. 2017) 
(qualified electing funds under the PFIC regime separating ordinary income from 
net capital gain as it passes through to shareholders). 
 127. I.R.C. § 951(a)(1) (inclusion of pro rata share of subpart F income). 
 128. I.R.C. § 904(d)(3) (Supp. 2017). 
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and characterizes the portion of the CFC inclusion 
attributable to passive category income of a CFC as passive 
category income to the U.S. shareholder.129 Unclear is 
whether subpart F income attributable to the active conduct 
of the CFC’s trade or business would be passive activity 
income in the hands of its U.S. shareholders for purposes of 
the passive activity loss limitations.130 In addition to 
character change for some income, the inclusion of subpart F 
income is limited to the CFC’s current earnings and profits—
a dividend concept and limitation. Non-subpart F losses of a 
CFC may diminish the current earnings and profits and 
prevent the inclusion of some or all of the subpart F income 
in the income of the U.S. shareholders.131 Application of 
assignment of income principles to shift income produces a 
less favorable outcome for the U.S. shareholders because 
assignment of income is specific to the gross shifted income. 
It would include shifted income in the U.S. shareholders’ 
incomes but would not permit the non-subpart F losses of the 
CFC to reduce the net amount shifted. 
Even if the assignment of income doctrine helps the CFC 
inclusion to reconcile, albeit less than comfortably, with 
Macomber’s characterization of stock dividends as not being 
income because they alter nothing in the relationship 
between the corporation and its shareholders and do not 
generate realized and includable gain, the assignment of 
income doctrine does not help with the transition tax. The 
transition tax does not redirect foreign earnings of a foreign 
corporation to its U.S. shareholders as the earnings accrue. 
Rather, the transition tax redefines accumulated foreign 
source earnings and profits of a foreign corporation as 
subpart F income in 2017. Macomber expressly rejected 
taxing accumulated earnings and profits to a corporation’s 
shareholders in the absence of a distribution. Such 
 
 129. I.R.C. § 904(d)(3)(B). 
 130. I.R.C. § 469 (Supp. 2017). 
 131. I.R.C. § 952(b)(1)(A) (Supp. 2017). 
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accumulated earnings and profits are not income but are 
part of the capital ownership that corporate shareholdings 
constitute. The transition tax does not alter the foreign 
corporation’s ownership of any of its property acquired with 
its earnings nor does it alter the U.S. shareholders’ 
relationship to that property. Inclusion in the U.S. 
shareholders’ incomes may encourage the corporation to 
distribute the accumulated earnings to its U.S. shareholders 
or cause the shareholders to demand distributions, but the 
income tax cannot compel those distributions nor has it ever 
before sought to do so. 
Use of the CFC provisions does not change the taxation 
of accumulated earnings and profits into current corporate 
earnings or shareholder income so long as the Supreme 
Court has not overruled its Macomber precedent. The 
transition tax, despite its use of the CFC mechanism, taxes 
U.S. shareholders on their capital ownership of foreign 
corporations. In so doing, it joins the ranks of previously 
enacted mark to market inclusion provisions132 limiting the 
constitutional realization principle as underpinning income 
inclusion under the Sixteenth Amendment. 
V. ABANDONING REALIZATION 
With the transition tax, Congress selectively abandoned 
the realization requirement and partially cleared the 
accumulation of foreign earnings that were a possible barrier 
to a systemic change in the tax law, that is, the new 
participation exemption.133 While the transition tax limits 
tax planning opportunities for a specific class of taxpayers, it 
leaves intact opportunities for other taxpayers to plan their 
tax deferrals and avoidances that rely on the realization 
principle. An investor in real estate, for example, may claim 
depreciation allowances134 while operating real estate that 
 
 132. E.g., I.R.C. § 1256 (2012); I.R.C. § 475 (2012); I.R.C. § 877A (2012). 
 133. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing I.R.C. § 245A). 
 134. I.R.C. § 167 (Supp. 2017) (depreciation generally); I.R.C. § 168 (Supp. 
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does not in fact depreciate in value and yet not be taxed on 
the gain in the value of the property as it appreciates in the 
market or as the investor rolls it over into other real estate 
without recognizing the gain realized in the exchange.135 
Ultimately the increase in value may escape taxation 
permanently when the investor dies and the beneficiaries of 
the investor’s estate sell the property free from any taxable 
gain because the property takes on a new, fair market value 
basis at the investor/owner’s death.136 
Legislating reduced rates of tax, as it did with a previous 
selective abandonment of the realization principle,137 
Congress bought the cooperation of many of those taxpayers 
the legislation affects adversely. On this occasion, in addition 
to a reduced rate of tax, the possibly illusory elimination of 
tax on future offshore earnings accompanied the reduced 
rate of tax.138 
This selective legislation traverses ground similar to 
that of the expatriation tax as well. With the transition tax, 
Congress chose a single moment on which to impose a tax on 
a limited group of taxpayers who earned no income and 
engaged in no otherwise taxable transaction. As the 
expatriation tax isolates an expatriating taxpayer from all 
other taxpayers, marks that taxpayer’s assets to market and 
includes the cumulative increase in value at the moment of 
expatriation even though the taxpayer changes no 
 
2017) (accelerated cost recovery as the depreciation allowance). 
 135. I.R.C. § 1031 (2012) (permitting the deferral of realized gain in a like-kind 
exchange of real property). 
 136. I.R.C. § 1014 (2012) (basis of property received from a decedent’s estate 
by reason of the decedent’s death). 
 137. I.R.C. § 1256 (2012) (characterizing sixty percent of the gain, without 
regard to holding period, as reduced rate long term capital gain). 
 138. The combined impact of the new provisions governing global intangible 
low-taxed income, I.R.C. § 951A (Supp. 2017) [hereinafter GILTI], foreign derived 
intangible income, I.R.C. § 250 (Supp. 2017) [hereinafter FDII], and the base 
erosion anti-abuse tax, I.R.C. § 59A (Supp. 2017) [hereinafter BEAT], undercut 
the benefit of the expanded dividend received deduction for foreign source income 
under I.R.C. § 245A (Supp. 2017). 
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relationship between any asset and herself, the transition 
tax includes the accumulated foreign earnings of a 
corporation in the incomes of its shareholders on a 
statutorily fixed date. Like the tax on long term capital gains, 
both the expatriation tax and the transition tax are 
cumulative rather than periodic taxes. Both the expatriation 
tax and the transition tax reach an accumulated amount of 
appreciation in property that may have accrued over a 
lengthy period but was not yet taxable under general tax 
rules. Both provisions tax cumulative appreciation at a 
single moment as the inclusion of realized and recognized 
long term capital gain taxes economic income accumulated 
over an extended period at the moment of the sale or 
exchange of the appreciated property. Neither the taxation 
of long term capital gain nor the expatriation tax is 
retroactive as they tax accumulated gain. The transition 
tax’s subpart F mechanism could be viewed as retroactive in 
that it redefines a foreign corporation’s income as subpart F 
income even though when that income was earned it became 
classified correctly as not subpart F income.139 Yet, in its 
resemblance to mark to market inclusion, the transition tax 
is taxing accumulated but previously untaxed appreciation 
in value. The transition tax could have used a mark to 
market mechanism for taxing all the accumulated foreign 
income, but avoided double taxation arguments and 
uncertainties by focusing instead on accumulated foreign 
earnings and profits not previously included in subpart F 
income. 
The practical outcome of both the expatriation and 
transition tax statutes is substantially the same as both will 
fail to reach all income that they might or should have 
captured. The expatriation tax will miss taxing the full value 
of many expatriating taxpayers’ assets as those taxpayers 
exploit discounting techniques developed in the estate 
 
 139. Adler & Willis, supra note 18, at 1423 (arguing the income was excluded, 
not deferred, income). 
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planning industry to minimize the mark to market 
inclusion.140 Similarly, the transition tax will miss much 
unrealized appreciation in the assets of CFCs and other 
specified foreign corporations because the measure of the 
foreign corporation’s earnings and profits does not include 
that unrealized appreciation and, when realized, that income 
may remain free from U.S. tax because of the extended 
dividends received deduction.141 Both taxes disregard the 
Macomber precedent and tax the unrealized appreciation in 
the taxpayer’s assets. The expatriation tax views 
expatriation, a change in the taxpayer’s status, as a taxable 
event.142 The transition tax goes a further step from 
realization as it taxes at a moment when neither the 
taxpayer’s relationship to the property nor the taxpayer’s 
status changes but there is a change in tax law. 
If constitutionally permissible under the Sixteenth 
Amendment, enactment of the transition tax reflects 
Congress’s power to abandon the realization requirement 
and impose a tax on accumulated but deferred economic 
income. At Congress’s whim, further targeted limitations on 
 
 140. Stephen J. Leacock, Lack of Marketability and Minority Discounts in 
Valuing Close Corporation Stock: Elusiveness and Judicial Synchrony in Pursuit 
of Equitable Consensus, 7 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 683, 686 (2016). On the use 
by the Trump family of sophisticated discounting techniques, see David 
Barstow, Susanne Craig & Russ Buettner, Trump Engaged in Suspect Tax 
Schemes as He Reaped Riches From His Father, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2018) 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/02/us/politics/donald-trump-tax-
schemes-fred-trump.html?searchResultPosition=9. 
 141. I.R.C. § 245A (referring to the participation exemption, i.e., the one 
hundred percent dividends received deduction for distributions from the foreign 
source earnings of a CFC). Congress appears not to have considered unrealized 
appreciation and its potential for increasing earnings and profits when it imposed 
the transition tax even though such unrealized appreciation affects other areas 
of tax law. For example, it is a factor in measuring whether or not an 
accumulation of earnings is beyond the reasonable needs of the business for 
purposes of the accumulated earnings tax. See I.R.C. § 532 (Supp. 2017) 
(accumulation of earnings beyond reasonable needs determinative of purpose to 
avoid shareholder level tax); I.R.C. § 531 (Supp. 2017) (accumulated earnings tax 
imposed). 
 142. For example, a taxpayer who is expatriating changes her status from U.S. 
person to non-U.S. person. 
2019] TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE TAX BASE 1397 
realization may take effect and create sub-groups of 
taxpayers who will capture a significant benefit or suffer a 
substantial detriment from the changes without outright 
abandonment of the historical realization-based income 
inclusion structure. Realization survives as the precursor to 
inclusion of gain on property but no longer limits the taxing 
power of Congress.143 
In its current, newly limited form, the realization 
requirement will continue to serve the propertied segments 
of American society,144 even though abandonment of 
realization would offer the opportunity to reexamine and 
separate those instances in which realization supports a 
significant tax policy purpose from those in which it no 
longer does or never did have a sound policy foundation. 
Unless abandoned, the realization requirement will continue 
to facilitate the accumulation of wealth by postponing, 
frequently forever, the contribution of any part of the growth 
in value of a taxpayer’s property to public needs.145 In 
 
 143. The TCJA also expressly undercuts the principle of horizontal equity that 
like taxpayers be taxed alike, as it separates the class of wage earners from the 
class of independent contractors. See I.R.C. § 199A (Supp. 2017) (allowing a 
twenty percent deduction for income derived from an unincorporated trade or 
business excluding the trade or business of an employee). Unlike realization with 
its constitutional underpinning in Macomber, horizontal equity in taxation is not 
a constitutional requirement in the United States unless a statute discriminates 
against a constitutionally protected group, so imposing a higher rate of tax on a 
specific group would be impermissible if embedded in the statutory language but 
would not be unconstitutional if the statute were facially neutral but had a 
disparate impact on a specific group. See Henry Ordower, Horizontal and Vertical 
Equity in Taxation as Constitutional Principles: Germany and the United States 
Contrasted, 7 Fla. Tax Rev. 259, 290–96 (2006). For example, I.R.C. § 199A may 
have such a disparate impact if a specific group has disproportional numbers of 
employees relative to sole proprietors. Germany, on the other hand, has express 
constitutional jurisprudence requiring horizontal equity in taxation. Id. at 301–
26. 
 144. See supra notes 134–36 and accompanying text. 
 145. The wealthiest taxpayers may continue to be subject to an estate tax at 
death but most taxpayers will remain free from the estate tax at its current $11.4 
million (or $22.8 million for married individuals combining their exemptions) 
inflation-adjusted exclusion. I.R.C. § 2010 (2012) (unified credit deduction 
equivalent). See also Rev. Proc. 2019-57 (showing most recent inflation 
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addition, selective abandonments of realization introduce 
uncertainty for taxpayers and encourage them to devote 
resources unnecessarily to tax planning to develop 
contingent tax plans.146 A stable, predictable set of rules on 
which to rely would be more efficient economically than the 
current state of uncertainty. 
A comprehensive tax base model would include annually 
in each taxpayer’s income “the change in the value of the 
store of property rights between the beginning and end of the 
period in question.”147 Currently, the realization 
requirement defers the inclusion in income of the increase in 
the value of the taxpayer’s store of property rights until the 
taxpayer sells or exchanges those rights for money or other 
property,148 or even longer if one of the gain recognition 
deferral provisions applies.149 Realization following the 
series of incursions on its territory is no longer an immutable 
requirement, if it ever was,150 but has been a matter of 
administrative convenience subject to limitation and 
alteration by Congress as most or all other tax rules.151 
 
adjustments). 
 146. Professor Dr. Drüen comments on the inefficiency of tax planning: “ . . . 
Steuerumgehung volkswirtschaftlich betrachtet . . . führt zur ineffizienten 
Allokation von Ressourcen, weil beträchtliches Personal in Unternehmen, 
Steuerberatung und Staat fern von wirtschaftlicher Nutzenmaximierung 
gebunden wird.” (citations omitted) (“from an economic perspective, tax 
avoidance . . . leads to inefficient allocation of resources as considerable 
personnel in business, tax planning industries, and the state remain far from 
economic production maximization activity.”) (author’s translation). Drüen, 
Unternehmerfreiheit und Steuerumgehung, StuW 2008, 154 (158). 
 147. SIMONS, supra note 6, at 50. 
 148. I.R.C. § 1001(a) (2012). 
 149. I.R.C. § 1001(c). See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1031 (Supp. 2017) (referring to like kind 
exchange of real property). 
 150. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1256 (2012) (mark to market for commodities futures); 
I.R.C. § 877A(a)(1) (2012) (expatriation tax). 
 151. Compare the assignment of income and tax benefit principles. Most 
academic commentators agree that, despite Macomber, realization is not a 
constitutional requirement. See Stanley S. Surrey, The Supreme Court and the 
Federal Income Tax: Some Implications of the Recent Decisions, 35 ILL. L. REV. 
779, 782–85 (1941) (emphasizing administrative convenience). The literature 
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Congress could and should require all taxpayers to measure 
and include in income annually the increase in the value of 
their respective stores of property rights. Although taxpayers 
might object to the change in law on a variety of policy 
grounds, an argument based on longstanding tradition or 
some vague vested right in continuing the law without 
change should fall flat following enactment of the transition 
tax that eliminated the longstanding (and vested) tradition 
of offshore deferral of business income. While there are policy 
arguments in favor of continuing a realization-based system, 
there are powerful arguments for elimination of realization. 
A great deal of tax simplification would accompany 
elimination of the realization requirement but elimination 
also would introduce new, but limited, complexity in 
valuation and collection. Hope for elimination of realization 
is certainly an unlikely and utopian dream, but with 
incursions past the realization barrier, a look at the 
advantages of eliminating the realization requirement 
recommends itself. 
Annual marking to market of all property for all 
taxpayers would add to the complexity of determining value 
for property for which there is no public trading market and 
cause some, possibly many, taxpayers to have to sell property 
to meet their tax obligations. In instances in which the sale 
of illiquid property becomes necessary, compulsion to pay 
might be ameliorated by deferred payment opportunities,152 
and, in limited instances, a diminished rate of tax.153 
Increases in value of illiquid property are likely to be gradual 
 
favoring a shift away from realization-based taxation is extensive. See, e.g., 
Deborah H. Schenk, An Efficiency Approach to Reforming a Realization-Based 
Tax, 57 TAX L. REV. 503, 503 (2004); David J. Shakow, Taxation Without 
Realization: A Proposal for Accrual Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1114–16 
(1986); Jeff Strnad, Periodicity and Accretion Taxation: Norms and 
Implementation, 99 YALE L.J. 1817, 1820 (1990). 
 152. Cf. I.R.C. § 877A(b) (2012) (expatriation tax payment deferral). 
 153. Cf. I.R.C. § 965(c) (Supp. 2017) (deduction for transition tax); I.R.C. 
§ 1(h)(1), (11) (2012) (referring to reduced rate on net capital gain and qualified 
dividends). 
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most of the time, and the possible decreases in tax rate 
accompanying a broader comprehensive tax base will 
prevent many taxpayers from suffering from the increased 
taxable income attributable to inclusion of appreciation in 
the value of their assets. The following paragraphs identify 
some tax simplifications and economic efficiencies that an 
accrual or accretion tax operating by a mark to market 
mechanism might generate.154 
A. Economic Income Taxed 
Professor Blum correctly pointed out that any argument 
that capital gains are not income is conclusory and not an 
argument at all.155 Arguments that a tax on capital gain is a 
tax on capital, rather than income, fail for much the same 
reason as the argument that capital gains are not income.156 
The Haig-Simons comprehensive income formula includes 
increase in value of capital as income.157 Although 
accounting conventions tend to eschew annual revaluation of 
assets because gain from revaluation may distort the 
measurement of profit and operating success,158 there are 
major segments of the national economy in which periodic 
revaluation is commonplace and essential to conduct of the 
effected business. For example, public and private 
investment funds, real estate investment trusts and pension 
funds must revalue their assets at frequent intervals to 
facilitate ongoing investment and withdrawal as well as the 
payment of management fees. Such investment funds play 
an ever greater role as the point of assembly of capital as 
direct individual investment in equities shifts to such 
 
 154. This portion of the article relies in part on Professor Walter J. Blum’s 
classic article: A Handy Summary of the Capital Gains Arguments. Blum, supra 
note 8. 
 155. Id. at 248. 
 156. Id. 
 157. SIMONS, supra note 6, at 50. 
 158. Blum, supra note 8, at 249. 
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indirect ownership through pooled investment vehicles.159 
Even in operating, as opposed to investment industries, asset 
revaluation becomes critical to facilitate acquisitions and 
financings and occasionally to support an extraordinary 
dividend when earned surplus is insufficient. 
The current failure to tax all economic income distorts 
the distribution of tax burdens. Taxpayers whose income is 
from their labor are taxed annually on all the income their 
labor produces,160 while those with property find that the 
periodic yield from the property that is subject to tax often is 
accompanied by growth in value of the property which is not 
taxed until sold. Taxing economic income would level the tax 
burden between labor and property ownership. In recent 
years, the U.S. trend and the trend in most highly developed 
economies has been the opposite, favoring income from 
capital. Taxes on income from property have retreated and 
taxes on labor have increased or remained unchanged.161 As 
such, a shift to an increased tax on income from property may 
prove elusive. Nevertheless, the broadened tax base from 
 
 159. Philippe Aghion, John Van Reenen & Luigi Zingales, Innovation and 
Institutional Ownership 103 AM. ECON. REV. 277, 302 (2013); Charles McGrath, 
80% of equity market cap held by institutions, PENSIONS & INVS. (Apr. 25, 2017, 
1:00 AM), https://www.pionline.com/article/20170425/INTERACTIVE/1704299 
26/80-of-equity-market-cap-held-by-institutions. 
 160. To a limited extent, taxpayers may divert a portion of their income from 
labor to tax deferred retirement savings and some non-taxable benefits if they 
are fortunate enough to have sufficient disposable income to defer and 
employment providing a structure for the non-taxable benefits. See I.R.C. 
§ 402(a) (Supp. 2017) (deferring inclusion to an employee until distribution from 
the qualified retirement plan). See also I.R.C. § 125(a) (2012) (providing an 
exclusion from gross income for contributions to a cafeteria plan). 
 161. In the U.S., for example, the TCJA reduced the rate of tax on corporate 
income to twenty-one percent, I.R.C. § 11(b) (Supp. 2017), and introduced a 
deduction for income from primarily capital-intensive unincorporated businesses 
of twenty percent. I.R.C. § 199A(a) (Supp. 2017). In 2003, the rate of tax on 
dividends declined to the rate imposed on net capital gain. See I.R.C. § 1(h)(11) 
(2000) amended by Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. 
L. No. 108-27, § 302(a), 117 Stat. 752, 760. In Scandinavia, a change to a dual 
income tax that imposed more favorable rates on capital than on labor began to 
manifest itself in 1987 in Denmark. Edward D. Kleinbard, An American Dual 
Income Tax: Nordic Precedents, 5 NW. J.L  & SOC. POL. 41, 42 (2010). 
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taxing economic income would produce more government 
revenue at current rates, which if unneeded, could be 
deployed to reduce rates of tax for all taxpayers. 
B. Lock-in 
With increase in value includable annually, tax burdens 
no longer would distort economically desirable choices to sell 
or convert property to match its highest and best use.162 As 
gain or loss becomes includable annually, the taxpayer would 
adjust the basis of property to reflect that income 
inclusion.163 Whenever the highest and best use of property 
changes, taxpayers could redeploy their property from 
unproductive to productive uses and claim depreciation 
allowances from an adjusted basis closer to current fair 
market value than under the current realization based 
system. Similarly, bunching of long-deferred gain into the 
year of sale no longer would deter taxpayers from selling 
property. Taxpayers would measure gain in the year of sale 
from a gradually increasing adjusted basis reflecting the 
annual inclusions of advances in value in their property. Sale 
in many instances would generate only a small, one-year 
gain even though proceeds of sale might be significant. If the 
taxpayers had been paying their tax on increases in value 
annually rather than deferring payment, most of their 
proceeds would be available for reinvestment. Existing 
statutes designed to overcome lock-in concerns like the like 
kind exchange provision for real property164 would become 
obsolete—a tax simplification. 
 
 162. Rate fluctuations on capital gains have exacerbated the lock in problem. 
David Kamin & Jason Oh, The Effects of Capital Gains Rate Uncertainty on 
Realization 21 (Oct. 27, 2018) (unpublished draft) (available at https:// 
www.ntanet.org/wp-content/uploads/proceedings/2017/NTA2017-310.pdf). 
 163. Cf. I.R.C. § 1016(a) (2012) (adjustments to basis). 
 164. I.R.C. § 1031(a)(1) (Supp. 2017) (deferral of realized gain on a like kind 
exchange of real property). Before 2018, the like kind exchange provision also 
applied to personal property used in a trade or business or held for investment. 
JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF PUBLIC LAW 115–97 
184 (2018). 
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C. Giving 
Death would cease to be the ultimate tax shelter because 
adjustment in basis to fair market value basis at death would 
become unnecessary.165 Lifetime gifts with respect to which 
the donee must assume the donor’s historical basis under 
current law166 and gifts at death yielding a new basis to the 
donee167 would become identical for tax purposes so that gift 
giving decisions would be fully independent of most tax 
considerations.168 The current lifetime gift basis rule is 
designed to neither encourage nor discourage gift giving. 
Taxing the donor on appreciation at the moment of the gift 
under current law might discourage gift giving as donors 
may be reluctant to pay a tax currently. Preserving the 
donor’s basis in the hands of the donee169 prevents the 
historical appreciation from escaping taxation when the 
donee disposes of the property.170 But the gift basis provision 
encourages donors to delay their gifts until death so that the 
recipient will not become taxable on the gain accruing during 
the donor’s period of ownership of the property that is the 
subject of the gift. With annual taxation of appreciation, 
donees always would receive property with a new, fair 
 
 165. See I.R.C. § 1014(a)(1) (2012) (basis of property received from a decedent 
is the fair market value of the property at the date of death or, if applicable, the 
alternate valuation date). The tax community has recognized that the new basis 
at death rule is unfair and inefficient, yet the effort to repeal that rule was a 
failure and has not garnered new support despite severe limitation on imposition 
of the estate tax. 
 166. See I.R.C. § 1015(a) (2012) (donee takes donor’s basis except fair market 
value at the date of the gift for purposes of computing a loss if the donor’s basis 
in the property exceeded the property’s fair market value on the date of the gift). 
 167. I.R.C. § 1014(a). 
 168. Transfer of income producing property to lower marginal bracket 
taxpayers would continue to be advantageous but many of the most likely gift 
recipients, the donor’s children, would be subject to the “kiddie tax” at the donor’s 
marginal rate. See I.R.C. § 1(g) (2012). 
 169. I.R.C. § 1015(a). 
 170. See Taft v. Bowers, 278 U.S. 470, 482 (1929) (holding that the recipient of 
a gift can be taxed on appreciation in value during the donor’s holding period). 
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market value basis; a substantial simplification of the tax 
rules. Appreciation or depreciation in value from the end of 
the previous taxable year to the date of the gift would be 
taxable to the donor. 
D. Charitable Giving 
The quirky and flawed policy of permitting property to 
yield a fair market value charitable contribution deduction 
without inclusion of gain to the donor would disappear, as 
would much of the complexity in reporting the value of 
charitable gifts. The current system of charitable 
contribution deductions subsidizes charities with tax 
revenue by permitting certain donors to redirect a portion of 
their income tax liability to the charitable donee.171 
Redirection occurs because the deduction diminishes the 
donor’s income tax liability by removing an amount equal to 
the deduction from the donor’s taxable income. The 
deduction is available only to taxpayers who itemize their 
deductions,172 a small percentage of the taxpaying public 
 
 171. See I.R.C. § 170(a)(1) (2012) (allowing a deduction for charitable 
contributions of money and property). See also Daniel Halperin, A Charitable 
Contribution of Appreciated Property and the Realization of Built-in Gain, 56 TAX 
L. REV. 1, 4 (2002). Whether any tax subsidy through charitable giving is 
justifiable and desirable seems a settled question and beyond the scope of this 
article. Nevertheless, the existence of the subsidy assumes that efficiency 
demands the subsidy because i) charities deliver necessary services more 
efficiently than the government does; ii) charities deliver necessary services the 
government will not or cannot deliver; or iii) because of the subsidy, charities 
capture additional funds that the government could not and apply them to 
delivery of necessary services. 
 172. See I.R.C. § 62 (2012) (adjusted gross income does not include the 
charitable contribution deduction as an adjustment); I.R.C. § 63(a) (2012 & Supp. 
2017) (taxable income is adjusted gross income less either (i) the I.R.C. § 199A 
deduction and the standard deduction defined in I.R.C. § 63(c) or (ii) gross income 
less all deductions including the charitable contribution deduction). Only 
taxpayers who have itemized deductions including the charitable contribution 
deduction exceeding in the aggregate the standard deduction will derive a tax 
benefit from the charitable contribution deduction. Non-itemizing taxpayers can 
achieve the same or even better benefit than itemizing taxpayers from a 
charitable contribution if they contribute their services to charity, rather than 
cash or property, because the value of the contributed services will be excluded 
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populated primarily by high-income taxpayers.173 
In the case of a contribution of property, the measure of 
the deduction in most instances is the fair market value of 
the property on the date of the gift. Exceptions limiting the 
deduction amount to the donor’s basis in the property apply 
to property which would not yield long term capital gain if 
sold by the donor174 and tangible personal property not 
related in service and use to the donee’s charitable 
purpose.175 The donor realizes no gain when contributing 
even substantially appreciated property to a charitable 
donee. With such donations, the tax subsidy is not only the 
amount of tax on the contribution amount but also the 
amount of tax that otherwise would have been imposed on 
the long-term capital gain when recognized. The effect is the 
equivalent to the new basis at death for non-charitable 
donees of appreciated assets from a decedent’s estate while 
the donor is still alive. If the gain were taxed on contribution, 
the donor might not make the gift, instead holding the 
property until the step-up in basis at the donor’s death.176 
Annual marking to market eliminates both the excess 
subsidy built into the current contribution deduction that 
currently is a function of not taxing the gain at the time of 
contribution and the donor’s incentive to hold the property 
 
from their gross incomes thus redirecting the tax on their services to the charity. 
Henry Ordower, Charitable Contributions of Services: Charitable Gift Planning 
for Non-Itemizers, 67 TAX LAW. 517, 517–19 (2014). 
 173. TAX POLICY CENTER, BRIEFING BOOK, 141 (2019) (ebook) https:// 
www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-are-itemized-deductions-and-who-
claims-them. 
 174. See I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(A) (limiting deduction to basis if gain not long-term 
capital). 
 175. See I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B) (limiting deduction for tangible personal 
property). 
 176. See Halperin, supra note 171, at 16–19 (arguing that gain forgiveness 
incentivizes charitable contributions when the donor otherwise would hold the 
property until death). Halperin is not persuaded that the incentive is efficient. 
Id. at 35. 
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until death to get the new basis.177 It is possible that some 
potential donors may shy away from charitable giving 
without the excess subsidy but the policy decision to ignore 
that concern seems already to have been made. Congress 
reduced the number of itemizers who make charitable 
contributions only because they are deductible when it 
enacted the TCJA in 2017 by increasing the standard 
deduction178 and encouraged cash rather than property 
donations by large donors with an increase in the charitable 
deduction limit to $60,000 for cash contributions only.179 
Marking to market also should diminish the number of 
overvaluations of charitable contributions, as any excess 
value will attract a tax on the gain to the donor in the year 
of the gift. If there continues to be a rate differential with the 
charitable contribution drawing an ordinary deduction while 
the gain is taxed at a lower rate imposed on net capital gain, 
the incentive, albeit diminished, for charitable giving of 
appreciated property and overvaluing that property will 
remain.180 But mark to market is likely to diminish the need 
for supporting appraisals for non-cash charitable 
contributions181 and exposure to overvaluation penalties,182 
except in limited circumstances. 
E. Inflation Adjustment to Basis 
A longstanding argument against taxing capital gain is 
that capital gain is not a real gain but rather a reflection of 
 
 177. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
 178. I.R.C. § 63(c)(7)(A) (2012 & Supp. 2017) (increasing standard deduction 
temporarily). 
 179. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(G)(i) (Supp. 2017) (increasing contribution base for cash 
charitable contributions temporarily). 
 180. And in those instances where taxpayers donate non-appreciating personal 
use property in which their basis exceeds the value, there also will remain an 
incentive to overvalue. 
 181. I.R.C. § 170(f)(11)(C) (appraisal requirements for contributions in excess 
of $5,000). 
 182. I.R.C. § 6662(b)(3) (2012). 
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inflation. While Professor Blum refuted the argument 
extensively dismissing it as absurd,183 the argument 
endures. In recent years, the argument has manifested itself 
as individuals proposed adjusting the basis of capital assets 
for inflation,184 adding to the many inflation adjustments 
that already have found their way into the Internal Revenue 
Code, further adding to its complexity.185 Marking to market 
undercuts any remaining arguments concerning inflation as 
only annual, as opposed to long term, inflation would be of 
significance. Annual inflation impacts all sources of income. 
The purchasing power of wages declines with inflation so 
wage increases are just as artificial as gain on property to 
the extent of inflation. Inflation impact on wages is 
ameliorated to a very limited extent by the inflation 
adjustment to rate brackets.186 That adjustment should 
suffice for property value inflation, or a modification of the 
brackets for income from marking to market if those brackets 
differ from ordinary income marginal rate brackets. 
If appreciation and depreciation are included in the 
annual tax base, tax law will become a great deal simpler 
than it is now.187 Features of the tax law such as depreciation 
 
 183. Blum, supra note 9, at 255–56. 
 184. Kyle Pomerleau, The Economic and Budgetary Impact of Indexing Capital 
Gains to Inflation, TAX FOUNDATION, Sept. 2018, at 1–8, https://files. 
taxfoundation.org/20180910132823/Tax-Foundation-FF610.pdf. Cf. Daren 
Fonda, Indexing Capital Gains to Inflation Would Be Great for the Rich. There’s 
No Economic Rationale., BARRON’S (Aug. 3, 2019 8:00 AM), https://www.barrons 
.com/articles/indexing-capital-gains-to-inflation-makes-no-economic-sense-
51564833600. 
 185. The IRS annually publishes the inflation adjustments in a revenue 
procedure. Rev. Proc. 2019-57 (showing most recent inflation adjustments). 
 186. I.R.C. § 1(f)(3) (2012) (cost of living adjustments) (modified and limited by 
I.R.C. § 1(j) (Supp. 2017)). 
 187. Sixty years ago, Walter J. Blum argued that capital gains as a principal 
source of complexity in tax law that was a sufficient reason for eliminating its 
preferred treatment. Blum, supra note 9, at 266. None of the provisions for 
depreciation recapture, qualified dividends, or qualified business income, infra 
notes 188–190, were in place when Blum made that observation. 
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recapture,188 the reduced rate of tax on qualified corporate 
dividends,189 and the new twenty percent qualified business 
income deduction190 have diminished the frequency with 
which taxpayers seek to convert ordinary income into capital 
gain. At the same time all those provisions have added to the 
complexity of the tax law. Similarly, limiting exploitation of 
opportunities to convert ordinary income from services into 
long-term capital gain through “carried interests” has proven 
to be particularly troubling for tax policymakers.191 The 
carried interest conundrum demonstrates that the timing 
and rate differentials between sales of property yielding 
long-term capital gain and ordinary, currently taxable 
income from business operation and performance of services 
have a great deal of continuing significance. The timing and 
rate differentials are a source of considerable complexity in 
tax law. With annual inclusion, taxpayers would have 
weaker, if any, incentives for seeking to convert ordinary 
income into long-term capital gain. Except for the limitation 
of the Medicare tax to income from services,192 a limitation 
mostly eliminated by the tax on net investment income,193 
annual marking to market would simplify an unnecessarily 
and enormously complex and often manipulated tax law. 
Nevertheless, the details of transitioning to and 
 
 188. I.R.C. § 1245 (2012) (depreciation recapture on personal property). 
 189. I.R.C. § 1(h)(11) (qualified dividends taxes at net capital gain rate). 
 190. I.R.C. § 199A (Supp. 2017) (qualified business income deduction). 
 191. I.R.C. § 1061 (Supp. 2017) (extending holding period requirement for 
capital gain on carried interest added by TCJA). On carried interest, see generally 
Chris William Sanchirico, The Tax Advantage to Paying Private Equity Fund 
Managers with Profit Shares: What Is It? Why Is It Bad?, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1071, 
1073 (2008); Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in 
Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 18 (2008). For an earlier discussion of 
the profits interest conundrum, see Henry Ordower, Taxing Service Partners to 
Achieve Horizontal Equity, 46 TAX LAW. 19, 19–41 (1992). 
 192. E.g., I.R.C. § 3101(b) (2012) (hospital insurance tax on wages); I.R.C. 
§ 1401(b) (2012) (hospital insurance portion of the self-employment tax). 
 193. I.R.C. § 1411(c) (2012) (tax on certain net investment income). The failed 
attempt to repeal the Affordable Care Act in 2017 permitted I.R.C. § 1411 to 
survive since it was a primary funding mechanism for the Affordable Care Act. 
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implementing a general mark to market system for taxing 
gain and loss are daunting. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The transition tax and the expatriation tax dispel any 
lingering doubts about the power of Congress to tax 
unrealized gains and losses at a moment Congress selects. 
Both the transition tax and the expatriation tax choose a 
single moment at which to tax gains and losses that have 
accumulated over long time periods. The transition tax 
reaches accumulations of corporate earnings after 1986194 
while the expatriation tax could reach much further back 
through generations of accumulated gains and losses195 as it 
forces expatriating taxpayers to mark all their property to 
market on the day before their expatriation.196 While the 
expatriation tax selects a taxation date related to the event 
of expatriation which otherwise might remove some property 
permanently from U.S. taxing jurisdiction,197 the transition 
tax chooses a date to facilitate an alteration in U.S. tax law 
without any event occurring specific to the taxpayer or the 
property taxed. 
Insofar as imposing tax on value, which has increased 
over extended periods, is permissible under both the 
transition tax and the expatriation tax without any 
realization event. Congress equally might choose a date on 
which to require all U.S. taxpayers to mark all their property 
to market and include in income the gain or loss on the 
 
 194. I.R.C. § 965(d) (Supp. 2017) (deferred foreign income accumulated after 
1986). 
 195. An expatriating taxpayer who received property from a donor during the 
donor’s lifetime would have the donor’s adjusted basis in the property under 
I.R.C. § 1015 and if the donor also received the property as a gift, the donor might 
have her donor’s adjusted basis reaching back several generations. 
 196. I.R.C. § 877A(a) (2012) (requiring all property to be treated as sold at fair 
market value the day before expatriation). 
 197. I.R.C. § 865 (2012) (sourcing gain from sale of personal property at the 
taxpayer’s residence, for example). 
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property as if it were sold at fair market value on the date 
selected to facilitate the transition to an annual mark to 
market tax system. Following the initial bulk marking to 
market and inclusion, taxpayers would mark their assets to 
market annually and again when they dispose of an asset. 
Dispositions by sale would yield gain or loss measured by the 
sale price less the adjusted basis as that basis has been 
adjusted to reflect previous markings to market. A 
disposition other than a sale would be equated with a sale at 
fair market value. 
Determination of fair market value might be 
troublesome for some property. The tax law, however, 
generally rejects claims that value is indeterminate.198 
General asset value reporting is certainly not 
unprecedented. Reporting is required under the estate tax at 
each decedent’s date of death.199 While the estate tax now 
reaches only estates in excess of 11.4 million dollars, for 
much of estate tax history, the requirement to determine the 
value of all a decedent’s property at date of death affected a 
broader segment of the taxpayer population than it now does. 
Moreover, even taxpayers who receive property from an 
estate not subject to the estate tax have an incentive to 
determine the value of property received to reset the 
adjusted basis of the property to fair market value at date of 
death.200 
Market quotations are available for a great deal of 
investment property—securities and currencies, for 
example—which is actively traded on a public market. 
Interests in closely held businesses are more difficult to 
 
 198. “The fair market value of property is a question of fact, but only in rare 
and extraordinary cases will property be considered to have no fair market 
value.” Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a) (amended 2017). 
 199. I.R.C. § 2001 (2012) (imposing estate tax). 
 200. I.R.C. § 1014 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-47) (explaining new basis 
in property received from a decedent). Annual marking to market would 
eliminate any lingering arguments for a new basis at death. See supra note 167 
and accompanying text. 
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value but some shorthand method for the initial valuation—
such as capitalization of operating revenue or income—might 
suffice to support the systemic transition to mark to market. 
Over time, annual increments in value will become 
increasingly accurate as a national value database develops. 
Much or most U.S. real property already is subject to periodic 
revaluation under state and local law for determination of ad 
valorum property taxes. Although the locally determined 
values do not utilize a uniform methodology across taxing 
jurisdictions and are quite possibly imperfect, they can serve 
the development of the national database of values. The 
national database would benefit local tax collectors as its 
accuracy improves. Other valuable property such as artwork, 
coins, memorabilia, and even gemstones initially will be 
subject to imperfect determinations of value but the 
imperfections will become less pronounced over time as the 
national value database develops. 
Real property located outside the U.S. and other non-
U.S. property for which there is no U.S. market may prove 
difficult to value so that imposition of the initial tax in rare 
instances may have to await the conversion of the property 
into cash or other property. A look-back rule like that for 
PFICs201 which averages the gain when included over the 
taxpayer’s holding period of the property accompanied by an 
interest charge may induce taxpayers to be forthcoming in 
their valuations and seek to determine value. 
To a limited extent, Congress can give taxpayers an 
incentive to identify value initially as accurately as possible 
through a rate system that favors the initial inclusion of 
unrealized gain. As Congress did with the transition tax,202 
a significant rate reduction for the initial gain inclusion 
would serve that purpose accompanying a higher rate for 
annual inclusions of mark to market gain. The initial tax 
 
 201. I.R.C. § 1291 (2012) (inclusion of PFIC assigns gain on sale ratably to each 
day in the taxpayer’s holding period). 
 202. I.R.C. § 965(c)(2) (Supp. 2017) (applying reduced rate of tax). 
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might distinguish traded from non-traded property and favor 
non-market traded assets that are more difficult to value.203 
An opportunity to pay the tax at transition to the mark to 
market system in installments would ease the burden of the 
one-time tax.204 
Marking to market will be burdensome to some, perhaps 
many, taxpayers. Where an active and open trading market 
exists for the taxpayer’s property, payment of the initial tax 
should prove uncomplicated. Since the gain will be taxed 
with or without a sale, sale of some holdings to pay the tax 
both initially and annually seems unproblematic. Taxpayers 
will remain reluctant to pay a lump sum tax but payment is, 
perhaps primarily, a psychological or emotional hurdle. 
Taxpayers who receive sizeable salary bonuses or severance 
payments generally have no opportunity to avoid or postpone 
the tax on those payments even though the tax leaves them 
with diminished resources. A mark to market tax paid with 
the proceeds from the sale of liquid assets is no more 
burdensome. 
Personal residences present a more serious difficulty in 
a mark to market system. Taxing the annual increase in the 
value of a personal residence in most instances differs little 
from the annual imposition of a property tax by the local 
taxing jurisdiction. Often in the context of a political anti-tax 
campaign, proponents of limitations on property taxes 
describe homeowners forced out of their homes when they 
are unable to pay their property taxes. Some jurisdictions 
offer relief to older citizens whose means of support is social 
security payments and pension plans described as fixed 
income individuals. Except in a market with steep 
appreciation in real property value because a specific 
neighborhood is gentrifying or a new and desirable resource 
has become available in the neighborhood, increases in value 
 
 203. Id. (lower rate by way of a larger deduction for operating, rather than 
liquid investment assets). 
 204. I.R.C. § 965(h) (regarding installment payment of the transition tax). 
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are likely to be moderate and the tax on them small. If 
exemptions for certain classes of homeowners become 
necessary to protect taxpayers from losing their homes, 
postponement of tax payment with low or no interest may be 
the simplest solution. 
Similarly, other illiquid assets, especially those of 
personal or sentimental value in addition to market value, 
may require some accommodation. For illiquid assets 
generally deferral of the tax payment beyond the installment 
reporting may be essential to prevent distress sales of assets 
to pay the tax. Deferred payment should draw an interest 
charge except items of personal or sentimental value. In the 
case of personal or sentimental property, deferred payment 
of the tax without interest as the property passes within the 
extended family might be a reasonable accommodation, but 
a value limitation simultaneously might be in order. In the 
absence of an estate tax on most estates, imposition of an 
income tax on appreciation in the value even of personal or 
sentimental property would not seem an outrageous 
demand. For lower income and wealth individuals, an 
exemption from the tax in the form of a separate zero rate 
tax bracket also might recommend itself. Although a 
separate zero bracket might make sense for the initial tax on 
transition to mark to market, creation of more permanent 
differential or schedular rates is troubling. Schedular rates 
discriminate in favor of taxpayers with some appreciating 
property relative to taxpayers with income only from the 
performance of services. Distinctions among types of income 
violate principles of horizontal equity.205 
Liquidity, especially to pay a concentrated tax at the 
transition to mark to market, remains a matter of concern. 
The concern, however, may be no greater with a mark to 
market system than under a realization-based system. If the 
realization event is accompanied by the receipt of money, 
 
 205. See supra note 143 and accompanying text (discussing the deduction for 
qualified business income with respect to horizontal equity under I.R.C. § 199A). 
1414 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  67 
realization increases the likelihood that the taxpayer will 
have the money with which to pay the tax. Often, however, 
even cash transactions do not yield sufficient proceeds to 
enable a seller to pay the tax on the seller’s gain if the 
property sold is encumbered by debt that the seller must 
repay. When a taxpayer exchanges property for property, the 
taxpayer frequently remains illiquid and unable to pay a tax 
on the gain. Under a realization system with opportunities 
to defer recognition and inclusion in income,206 the lack of 
liquidity is unproblematic. Yet, Congress newly limited the 
general recognition deferral rule for like-kind exchanges to 
real property indicating that Congress did not view the need 
for general deferral as compelling. Annual marking to 
market will diminish further or eliminate the need for 
deferral provisions, as unrealized gain at any point is likely 
to be small. 
The TCJA offers a rare opportunity to reexamine 
systemic characteristics of the U.S. income tax system as the 
TCJA rejects realization and undercuts the principle of 
horizontal equity. Although the act seems to favor taxpayers 
with high income and wealth,207 it removes historical fetters 
that may have prevented Congress from reconsidering 
fundamental and longstanding tax policies hampering 
enactment of changes in law to distribute tax burdens 
differently from custom. Timing of the inclusion of gain in 
income and the capital gain rate preference are functions of 
longstanding policies that have begun to become obsolete or 
are not yet obsolete but are obsolescing. Historically, 
unrealized gain may have been difficult to measure 
accurately, but current data analytics have progressed and 
 
 206. I.R.C. § 1031 (2012) (like-kind exchanges of real property); I.R.C. § 721 
(2012) (exchanges of property for a partnership interest); I.R.C. § 351 (2012) 
(exchange of property for corporate shares). 
 207. See, e.g., Howard Gleckman, The TCJA Shifted The Benefits Of Tax 
Expenditures to Higher-Income Households, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Oct. 16, 2018), 
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/tcja-shifted-benefits-tax-expenditures-
higher-income-households. 
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large data base management renders valuation considerably 
more certain than it was, especially as the database matures. 
Among the strongest and most enduring arguments for a 
long-term capital gain rate preference is the concentration of 
the gain into a single tax period.208 Except for the year of 
transition to a general mark to market system when this 
Article proposes a reduced rate and possibly installment 
payment following the model of the transition tax, 
concentration is not an issue and that justification for a 
reduced rate falls by the wayside. 
 
 
 208. Blum, supra note 8, at 253. 
